The Phantom of a Polarized America: Myths and Truths of an Ideological Divide by Manabu Saeki

Author:Manabu Saeki [Saeki, Manabu]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: United States, Political Ideologies, Political Parties, Political Science, Political Process, History, Conservatism & Liberalism, 21st Century
ISBN: 9781438459097
Google: p4l-CwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 27787550
Publisher: SUNY Press
Published: 2016-02-01T00:00:00+00:00

Figure 5.17. Bicameral Pivotal Gridlock Interval

Corollary 1: Pivotal Bicameral Gridlock

V congress = V chamber 1, if | V chamber 1 | > | V chamber 2 |.

The cartel interval movement model is likely to maintain similar assumptions. Cox and McCubbins suggest bicameral interactions when they define and argue for what they call “inconsequential rolls” (2005, 106–123). In the postbellum House, Cox and McCubbins find that forty-nine bills were passed in spite of opposition from the majority of the majority party. Cox and McCubbins maintain that approximately half of these passed bills, which are the so-called majority rolls, are measures that the House majority leaders knew ex ante that the Senate would eventually reject or that the president would veto.

Figure 5.18 illustrates ideal points of the Senate and House medians (Ms and Mh), and their respective reflection points through the preferences of the majority of the majority parties (Mj s and Mj h). In this situation, the majority of the majority party in the House is likely to support a measure to move the status quo q1 to q1’, but the majority of the majority party in the Senate will likely oppose the bill. Also, the majority of the Senate is likely to support a bill to move the status quo q2 to q2’, but the majority of the House will likely oppose the bill. Given that an enactment of legislation requires the passage of a bill in both the chambers of Congress, neither the legislation to move the status quo q1 to q1’, nor the bill to move the status quo q2 to q2’, will be passed by Congress. Thus, among the cameral medians in the two chambers and their reflection points through the preferences of the majority of the majority parties, the two diametrically extreme points constitute a cartel gridlock interval. Consequently, in Figure 5.19, the cartel gridlock interval extends between the reflection point of the Senate median and the ideal point of the House median.

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